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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1986, Arif Durrani purchased $347,000.00 in Hawk missile
parts from an American company.1 He certified to the American
company that he would be responsible for complying with all export
obligations, signed a written statement acknowledging that the
parts required an export authorization, and knowingly shipped
them abroad without appropriate licensing.2 Durrani was charged
with violating the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), which requires
Department of State (State Department) licensing for all exports of
defense articles.3 Durrani’s defense: the United States government
directed him to do it.4
Shortly preceding Durrani’s indictment, the now notorious Iran-
Contra Affair was well underway,5 and Durrani claimed that he had
met with Col. Oliver North, who “assured him ‘not to worry about
the paperwork’ because President Reagan would shortly authorize
arms shipments to Iran.”6 The court examined as an affirmative
defense a statutory exemption to the licensing requirement, which
would permit defense exports without a license if for official use by
the United States government (U.S. government), or as part of a
foreign assistance program.7 In its analysis, the court described the
AECA’s legislative history as “sparse”8 and turned to the AECA’s
implementing regulations, the International Traffic in Arms Regu-
lations (ITAR), to guide its interpretation of the government exemp-
tion (Section 126.4).9
Section 126.4 of the ITAR implements a statutory exemption to
the AECA’s hard and fast licensing rule.10 The statute sets forth
what appears to be a straightforward rule: unless otherwise noted,
a license is not required for the export of defense articles “for official
use by a department or agency of the United States Government, or
. . . for carrying out any foreign assistance or sales program
1. United States v. Durrani, 835 F.2d 410, 413 (2d Cir. 1987).
2. Id. at 414.
3. Id. at 415.
4. Id. at 416.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 417. For more information on the Iran-Contra Affair, see Executive Summary,
S. REPNO. 100-216, at 7 (1987) (Executive Summary).
7. Durrani, 835 F.2d at 417.
8. Id. at 420.
9. Id. at 418–19.
10. Id. at 419.
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authorized by law and subject to the control of the President by
other means.”11 Despite the plain language of the statute and the
assistance of its implementing regulation Section 126.4, evolving
circumstances and the increasing role of contractors in military op-
erations has driven certain exporters and contractors to understand
the limits of the exemption.12
Despite the shoddiness of Durrani’s claim and doubtfulness of his
credibility, his case presents a fascinating—and extremely rare13—
glimpse into a court’s interpretation of a regulatory loophole that
allows exporters to ship the most highly-controlled military tech-
nology around the world with fairly limited governmental over-
sight. The rule attempts to answer the question, “when can a pri-
vate entity ship military equipment at the direction of the govern-
ment without prior approval by the State Department?”—but it of-
ten creates more questions than it answers. In 2019, the State De-
partment amended the language in an attempt to clarify contrac-
tors’ responsibilities under the ITAR.14 This article will explore this
amendment in light of the increasing need for contractor support.
Contractors play an ever-increasing role in supporting the United
States military.15 An American contractor was killed in December
2019 in a rocket attack in Kirkuk, Iraq, one of many recent military
actions involved in the escalation of tensions with Iran.16 Little in-
formation about this contractor has been made public,17 but unfor-
tunately, their plight is not uncommon. During President Barack
Obama’s presidency, more civilian contractors were killed in Iraq
and Afghanistan than American troops.18 These overseas contin-
gency operations create numerous legal complexities: what are
11. Id. at 418 (citing 22 U.S.C. § 2778(b)(2)).
12. See infra Section III(A)(1)–(2).
13. Only two cases have interpreted Section 126.4. See generally Durrani, 835 F.2d 410.
See also United States v. Modarressi, 690 F. Supp. 87, 91 (D. Mass. 1988) (“These exceptions
are applicable, however, only in specific, narrow circumstances. They require, among other
things, that a transaction be effected solely by a United States government agency (22 C.F.R.
§ 126.4) or that an article be transferred by the Department of Defense to a representative of
a foreign government in the United States (22 C.F.R. § 126.6).”).
14. International Traffic in Arms Regulations: Transfers Made by or for a Department
or Agency of the U.S. Government, 84 Fed. Reg. 16,398, 16,399 (Apr. 19, 2019) (to be codified
at 22 C.F.R. § 126.4 (2019)) [hereinafter Final Rule].
15. See infra Section III(A).
16. Barbara Starr, US Civilian Contractor Killed in Rocket Attack in Iraq, CNN (Dec. 27,
2019, 9:47 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/12/27/politics/iraq-rocket-attack-contractor-killed
/index.html.
17. Id.
18. Micah Zenko, Mercenaries Are the Silent Majority of Obama’s Military, FOREIGN
POL’Y (May 18, 2016, 4:58 PM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/05/18/private-contractors-are-
the-silent-majority-of-obamas-military-mercenaries-iraq-afghanistan/.
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contractors’ rights under the Geneva Convention?19 What are their
authority and obligations under military law?20 How are civilians
overseas held accountable for their actions?21 One overlooked prob-
lem of the growing policy of maintaining a heavily civilian-based
military force is seemingly inconsequential, but can in fact be a sig-
nificant threat to national security: how are the United States’ ex-
port laws—and their implementing agencies’ procedures—adapting
to give contractors greater flexibility while holding them accounta-
ble?
This article will begin by discussing the background of the AECA
and the ITAR, describing their purpose, authority, licensing re-
quirements, and license exemption framework. It will then analyze
the recently amended “government exemption,” Section 126.4,
whose vague language has historically plagued contractors and ad-
ministrative agencies alike. Section III(A) will discuss the increas-
ing role of private contractors in conducting military operations and
illustrate how these contractor-exporters will ultimately benefit
from this amended exemption, while Section III(B) will argue that
this rule reflects a trend of allowing such contractors increased con-
trol over activities that are inherently or closely associated with in-
herently governmental functions.
The exemption regime of the ITAR acknowledges the need for pri-
vate individuals to export defense articles overseas in support of
U.S. government operations, and the 2019 amendment to Section
126.4 illustrates the State Department’s recognition of the mili-
tary’s need for increased contractor mobility. With this increased
deference to contractors, however, comes a heightened need for
oversight.
II. THE ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT, ITAR AUTHORIZATIONS,
AND THE SECTION 126.4 EXEMPTION
A. Arms Export Control Act
The federal government controls the proliferation of military
equipment and technology primarily via the AECA.22 The stated
goals of the AECA are “a world which is free from the scourge of
war and the dangers and burdens of armaments” and “to facilitate
19. See, e.g., Gordon L. Campbell, Contractors on the Battlefield: The Ethics of Paying
Civilians to Enter Harm’s Way and Requiring Soldiers to Depend upon Them, Presentation
to the Joint Services Conference on Professional Ethics (Jan. 27 28, 2000).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 2751 2799.
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the common defense by entering into international arrangements
with friendly countries which further the objective of applying
agreed resources of each country to programs and projects of coop-
erative exchange of data, research, development, production, pro-
curement, and logistics support to achieve specific national defense
requirements and objectives.”23 The government attempts to strike
a balance between its interest in keeping military equipment out of
enemies’ hands and being competitive in the international defense
market. One former Assistant Secretary for Political-Military Af-
fairs, John Hillen, stated the purpose of export controls very con-
cisely, when describing a very expensive effort to destroy 24,000
MANPADS (man-portable air defense systems): “[h]ow much more
effective—in terms not only of dollars, pounds sterling or euros, but
also in terms of human lives—would it have been to have exercised
responsible export controls in the first place and kept these weap-
ons out of the hands of our enemies?”24
Generally, the AECA provides that, in furtherance of Congress’s
stated goals, the State Department, under the direction of the Pres-
ident, is responsible for supervising and monitoring sales and ex-
ports of defense articles and defense services in coordination with
economic and political factors.25 Exports of defense articles must be
in accordance with United States foreign policy, and strict end-user
requirements are set forth to ensure that defense articles and tech-
nology are truly for the use of the named recipient and for the stated
purpose.26 Such purposes include the foreign country’s self-defense,
cooperative projects,27 public works, nuclear non-proliferation, or to
allow the country to participate in arrangements consistent with
the United Nations Charter, among others.28 Its implementing reg-
ulations, however, contain specific rules and procedures for carry-
ing out the policies in the AECA.29
23. Id. § 2751.
24. John Hillen, Assistant Secretary for Political-Military Affairs, Dep’t of State, Address
to the 18th Annual Global Trade Controls Conference (Nov. 3, 2005) (transcript available at
the U.S. Department of State Website at https://2001-2009.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rm/56557.htm).
25. 22 U.S.C. § 2752(b).
26. Id. § 2753(a)(1)–(2).
27. Cooperative projects under the AECA include written agreements “undertaken in
order to further the objectives of standardization, rationalization, and interoperability of the
armed forces of [NATO],” id. § 2767(b)(1), or “a jointly managed arrangement, described in a
written agreement among the parties, which is undertaken in order to enhance the ongoing
multinational effort of the participants to improve the conventional defense capabilities of
the participants . . . .” Id. § 2767(b)(2).
28. Id. § 2754.
29. The International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), U.S. DEP’T OF STATE
DIRECTORATE OF DEF. TRADE CONTROLS, https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/ddtc_public?id=ddt
c_kb_article_page&sys_id=24d528fddbfc930044f9ff621f961987 (last visited Feb. 11, 2020).
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B. International Traffic in Arms Regulations
The President delegated the implementing regulations of the
AECA to the State Department.30 The implementing regulations,
the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), set forth a
complex regulatory regime for the authorization of defense ex-
ports.31 The ITAR controls defense articles, defense services, and
technical data.32 Defense articles are tangible items and technical
data subject to the United States Munitions List (USML).33 How-
ever, technical data and defense services somewhat warp the con-
ventional wisdom of what an export is.34 Technical data is defined
as any information, including software, “required for the design, de-
velopment, production, manufacture, assembly, operation, repair,
testing, maintenance or modification of defense articles.”35 Simi-
larly, a defense service is the provisioning to a foreign person of
technical data, assistance in the use of a defense article, or military
training.36 Exports, then, are not as straightforward as shipping an
item overseas; merely discussing controlled technical data with a
non-citizen in the United States could constitute an export.37 All
defense exports must be authorized by the State Department
through its regime of licensing, agreements, and exemptions.38
Failure to comply with the ITAR subjects exporters to civil and
criminal penalties, up to $1,000,000.00 per violation or debar-
ment.39
1. Licensing and Agreements
The Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) reviews and
approves export license applications, and different types of exports
30. Exec. Order No. 13,637, 78 Fed. Reg. 16,129 (Mar. 13, 2013).
31. See International Traffic in Arms Regulations, 22 C.F.R. §§ 120–130 (2019).
32. Id. § 120.2.
33. Id.
34. See, e.g., Final Rule, supra note 14, at 16,400 (addressing public comments express-
ing concern with the proposed rule’s removal of the term “technical data” from the language
of the exemption: “Several commenters noted the removal of the reference to technical data
and assumed that this indicated that the exemption would no longer authorize exports of
technical data. As noted above, the Department removed the reference to technical data
because it was redundant and confusing. Technical data is a form of defense article and is
authorized by the language authorizing the export (now export, reexport, retransfer, and
temporary import) of defense articles.”).
35. 22 C.F.R. § 120.10(a)(1) (2014).
36. Id. § 120.9.
37. Id.
38. E.g., id. §§ 123.1, 123.5.
39. Id. §§ 127.1, 127.3, 127.10.
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require different types of licenses.40 Long-term arrangements for
the provision of defense services or technical data require a Tech-
nical Assistance Agreement (TAA) or Manufacturing License
Agreement (MLA),41 while regular shipments of hardware or soft-
ware may require only a DSP-5 license for the permanent export of
hardware or technical data.42 Regardless of the method, all exports
of defense articles or technical data require review by DDTC unless
it falls into one of few exceptions in the ITAR.43 License and agree-
ment applications require the exporter to disclose details of the sale
or contract under which they are exporting to the DDTC, including
the end user, the quantity, the USML classification, and the dollar
value of the items.44 The DDTC then reviews the application, in
conjunction with other bureaus within the State Department, the
Department of Defense (DoD), and other interested agencies, to en-
sure that it aligns with foreign policy.45
While the population of exporters needing authorization to ship
controlled military equipment may seem small, the DDTC received
roughly 37,000 license applications in 2018.46 The DDTC takes on
average thirty-four days to process an application.47 This long turn-
around time drives exporters, many of whom are private defense
contractors, to seek exemptions to the strict licensing requirements
of the ITAR.48
40. Id. § 123.1(a)(1) (4).
41. Id. § 124.1(a).
42. Id. § 123.1(a)(1).
43. Defense Trade Controls Licensing (DTCL), U.S. DEP’T OF STATE DIRECTORATE OF
DEF. TRADE CONTROLS, https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/ddtc_public?id=ddtc_kb_article_page
&sys_id=02bbbbc4dbc7bf0044f9ff621f9619ac (last visited Oct. 4, 2019).
44. Guidelines for Completion of a Form DSP-5 Application/License for Permanent Ex-
port of Unclassified Defense Articles and Related Unclassified Technical Data, U.S. DEP’T OF
STATE DIRECTORATE OF DEF. TRADE CONTROLS, https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/sys_attach-
ment.do?sysparm_referring_url=tear_off&view=true&sys_id=cfd37af0db199f00d0a370131f
96199d (last visited Oct. 26, 2019).
45. Jonathan Dennis, Complying with ITAR Controls: License Review Pro-
cess, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE 6 12 (Sept. 19, 2016), https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/sys_attachm
ent.do?sysparm_referring_url=tear_off&view=true&sys_id=29acd359db9ddf00d0a370131f9
61942.
46. Defense Trade Controls Licensing (DTCL), supra note 43.
47. Id.
48. See Clinton Long, An Imperfect Balance: ITAR Exemptions, National Security, and
U.S. Competitiveness, 2 NAT’L SEC. L.J. 43, 62 (2013) (“Loosening the restrictions of ITAR
has been welcomed by U.S. industries because it provides them with additional opportunities
to sell their defense products with less bureaucracy.”).
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2. Exemptions
Interspersed throughout the regulatory labyrinth of the ITAR are
various exemptions to the “ask first, export later”49 principle.50 Un-
der very specific circumstances, exporters may be able to export or
temporarily import hardware or software, share technical data, or
perform defense services without the need for separate licensing.51
Though an exporter still needs to be registered with the DDTC in
order to be eligible to use an exemption,52 as well as maintain rec-
ords of all exemptions,53 it is typically a much more expeditious pro-
cess than to apply for a license or agreement.54
Exemptions are available for a variety of purposes, but each of
them represents a carefully calculated foreign policy considera-
tion.55 Some exemptions are based on the close relationship with
the end-user country; for example, exemptions exist for shipping
hardware and data to certain friendly countries, like Canada.56
Similarly, pursuant to Defense Trade Cooperation Treaties, the
ITAR sets forth exemptions for Australia57 and the United King-
dom.58 The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) partners
also receive special treatment under the ITAR through exemptions
that permit American exporters to maintain equipment for NATO,
Japan, and Sweden without a TAA59 and to share technical data for
NATO countries’ bid proposals.60 There are dozens of other exemp-
tions throughout the ITAR, organized in no intuitive manner.61
Frequenters of license exemptions include defense contractors, uni-
versity laboratories, and federally funded research and
49. MARK K. NEVILLE, JR., INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES:
STATUTES AND STRATEGIES ¶ 16.03 (2019).
50. JOHN R. LIEBMAN ET AL., CONG. RSCH. SERV., R41916, THE U.S. EXPORT CONTROL
SYSTEM AND THE EXPORT CONTROL REFORM INITIATIVE § 4.05[1] (2014).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. 22 C.F.R. § 123.26 (2012).
54. See Tom Reynolds, Stop, Read and Apply ITAR Exemptions, EXP. SOLS.,
https://www.exportsolutionsinc.com/resources/blog/stop-read-and-apply-itar-exemptions/
(Jan. 14, 2019).
55. Long, supra note 48, at 63 (“Either national security is compromised or economic
interests suffer, and whichever is the priority for lawmakers at any given time when ITAR
is modified will win at the end of the day.”).
56. 22 C.F.R. § 126.5 (2012).
57. Id. § 126.16.
58. Id. § 126.17.
59. Id. § 124.2(c).
60. Id. § 125.4(c).
61. LIEBMAN ET AL., supra note 50 (“There are approximately seventy-five frequently
amended exemptions scattered throughout the ITAR, but because the official version of the
ITAR contains no index, ITAR readers may be unaware that an exemption is available.”).
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development centers.62 Strikingly, between the period of 2004 and
2006, four defense contractors alone comprised twenty-five percent
of the exemption certification letters issued by the DoD.63 One long-
questioned ITAR exemption, and the subject of this article, is the
license exemption for transfers to or on behalf of the United States
government.64
C. The United States Government Exemption
1. Prior Language of the Exemption
The revision of Section 126.4 was “long-awaited” by defense con-
tractors65 as the previous language of the exemption proved to be
“complex and difficult to use.”66 Prior to the 2019 amendment, the
Section 126.4 exemption authorized the “temporary import, or tem-
porary export, of any defense article, including technical data or the
performance of a defense service, by or for any agency of the U.S.
Government for official use by such an agency, or for carrying out
any foreign assistance, cooperative project, or sales program . . . .”67
On its face, this exemption seemed to allow the government, in
its official capacity, to temporarily import, or temporarily export,
defense articles, technical data, or defense services.68 However, the
phrase “by or for” insinuated that the exemption was also open to
other non-government entities. The rule went on to specify that the
exemption:
applies only when all aspects of a transaction (export, carriage,
and delivery abroad) are affected by a United States Govern-
ment agency or when the export is covered by a United States
Government Bill of Lading. This exemption, however, does not
apply when a U.S. Government agency acts as a transmittal
62. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-07-1103, CLARIFICATION AND MORE
COMPREHENSIVE OVERSIGHT OF EXPORT EXEMPTIONS CERTIFIED BY DOD ARE NEEDED
(2007).
63. Id.
64. 22 C.F.R § 126.4 (2019 Amended Rule).
65. See, e.g., Williams Mullen & Thomas McVey, ITAR Amendment Expands License Ex-
emption for Transfers by or for the U.S. Government, JD SUPRA (Sept. 10, 2019),
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/itar-amendment-expands-license-71842; John R. Shane
& Lori E. Scheetz, DDTC Makes Long-Awaited Clarification to the ITAR 126.4 Exemption,
WILEY (Apr. 19, 2019), https://www.wiley.law/alert-DDTC-Makes-Long-Awaited-Clarifica
tion-to-the-ITAR-1264-Exemption.
66. Mullen & McVey, supra note 65.
67. 22 C.F.R. § 126.4(a) (2019 Pre-Amended Rule) (emphasis added).
68. Id.
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agent on behalf of a private individual or firm, either as a con-
venience or in satisfaction of security requirements.69
This provision provides some insight as to how this rule is used
by contractors and government agencies alike. It suggests that pri-
vate individuals and firms could, in fact, ship defense articles
abroad without prior DDTC authorization, but only when the entire
transaction is carried out by the government.70 It also hints at how
some exporters have tried to abuse it in the past. By specifying that
the rule does not apply when the government agency acts merely as
a transmittal agent, the State Department prohibits agencies from
circumventing the export control process by simply loading contrac-
tors’ materiel into a government jet and expediting its shipment
abroad. The government is also not authorized to make any export
that is otherwise prohibited by law.71
The final portion of the former version of the rule provided some
guidance on shipments, not by the government, but for end-use by
the government, suggesting that this carve-out is intended for pri-
vate entities. The rule provided:
(c) A license is not required for the temporary import, or tem-
porary or permanent export, of any classified or unclassified
defense articles, including technical data or the performance of
a defense service, for end-use by a U.S. Government Agency in
a foreign country under the following circumstances:
(1) The export or temporary import is pursuant to a con-
tract with, or written direction by, an agency of the U.S.
Government; and
(2) The end-user in the foreign country is a U.S. Govern-
ment agency or facility, and the defense articles or tech-
nical data will not be transferred to any foreign person;
and
(3) The urgency of the U.S. Government requirement is
such that the appropriate export license or U.S.
69. 22 C.F.R. § 126.4(a) (2019 Pre-Amended Rule).
70. The exemption also applied when the shipment was authorized by a United States
Government Bill of Lading. A Government Bill of Lading is an official contract of carriage
document setting forth terms with the transporter. 41 C.F.R. § 102-117.85 (2019).
71. 22 C.F.R. § 126.4(b) (2019 Pre-Amended Rule).
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Government Bill of Lading could not have been obtained in
a timely manner.72
This provision opened significant opportunity and risk for con-
tractors, particularly those under contract with the U.S. govern-
ment to provide defense articles and services abroad. It drew a
seemingly narrow boundary around when Section 126.4 may be
used. Applying all three of its elements, it only authorized those
private entities that are under contract or written direction from
the U.S. government to ship defense articles abroad on very short
notice.
The exemption in its prior state was vague, causing confusion
among exporters (and their lawyers) as to how and when the provi-
sion could be invoked.73 The rule also drove a wedge between the
State Department and the DoD as to the authorization authority
and recordkeeping requirements for such exports.74 In May 2015,
the State Department proposed a rule change to clarify the conten-
tious language,75 and in April 2019, the final rule went into effect.76
2. Significant Changes in the Amended Rule
The most significant change in the 2019 amendment is the sepa-
ration of Sections 126.4(a) and (b), which divides the authorization
cleanly between exports by the government and exports for or on
behalf of the government.77 The prior rule chaotically lumped in
Section 126.4(a) a cluster of circumstances where an exporter,
whether it be the government or a private entity, could temporarily
export, import, or perform a defense service.78 The prior paragraph
of Section 126.4(c), on the other hand, seemed to be, but was not
expressly directed at parties other than the United States govern-
ment, and gave loose guidance about how that exemption could be
used.79 The new language of the exemption carves out Section
126.4(a) specifically for use by the government agency with very
limited applicability to private entities.80
72. Id. § 126.4(c) (2019 Pre-Amended Rule).
73. Shane & Scheetz, supra note 65.
74. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITYOFF., supra note 62.
75. Exports and Temporary Imports Made to or on Behalf of a Department or Agency of
the U.S. Government, 80 Fed. Reg. 29,565, 29,565 (proposed May 22, 2015).
76. Final Rule, supra note 14, at 16,398.
77. Id.
78. 22 C.F.R. § 126.4(a)–(c) (2019 Pre-Amended Rule).
79. Id. § 126.4(c) (2019 Pre-Amended Rule).
80. 22 C.F.R. § 126.4 (2019 Amended Rule).
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The public comments to the proposed rule “specifically asked the
Department to state that any use by a U.S. Government contractor
in the course of contract is within the scope of official use by the
U.S. Government.”81 The department accepted this recommenda-
tion in the new rule and provided clearer criteria for when use by a
contractor qualifies as “official use.”82 Section 126.4(b) now belongs
to contractors: it omits the need for a license when shipping to a
department of the U.S. government or an entity other than the U.S.
government at its written direction.83
Another significant change is found at Section 126.4(b)(1), which
now provides that an entity may export without a license to the U.S.
government “at its request.”84 Previously, private contractors ship-
ping to the U.S. government abroad were burdened with additional
elements, including being in a contract with or at written direction
of the government, verifying that the end-user is the U.S. govern-
ment, and extreme urgency.85 The “at its request” standard sug-
gests that there is a lower bar for exporters to ship directly to the
U.S. government; notably, the rule implies that the request need
not even be in writing, at least for purposes of ITAR compliance.86
Further, the exemption no longer requires that the government ef-
fect the entire transaction.87 With this change, private entities
shipping to the government, or to a foreign person at the written
direction of the government, no longer need to question whether
they are exporting “by” or “for” the government for one of the ap-
proved purposes.
The amended rule also adds a provision to expressly prohibit ex-
ports that would otherwise violate the law, such as United Nations
Security Council Resolutions and U.S. arms embargoes.88 This is a
seemingly obvious and intuitive catch-all rule to contour the U.S.
government exemption. However, like the other changes in the
rule, its addition suggests that the broadening of the exemption
raised concerns with the DDTC that exporters—and potentially
even government agencies themselves—would attempt to export
81. Final Rule, supra note 14, at 16,400.
82. Id.
83. 22 C.F.R. § 126.4(b) (2019 Amended Rule).
84. Id. § 126.4(b)(1) (2019 Amended Rule).
85. 22 C.F.R. § 126.4(c)(1) (3) (2019 Pre-Amended Rule).
86. 22 C.F.R. § 126.4(c)(1) (3) (2019 Amended Rule). Section 126.4(c) previously re-
quired a contract or written direction for use of the “by or for” exception. 22 C.F.R. § 126.4(c)
(2019 Pre-Amended Rule).
87. 22 C.F.R. § 126.4(a) (2019 Amended Rule). This requirement was removed from Sec-
tion 126.4(a) (2019 Pre-Amended Rule).
88. 22 C.F.R. § 126.4(d) (2019 Amended Rule).
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controlled technology to countries with a heightened risk of diver-
sion to enemy nations or terrorist organizations.89
Section 126.4(d) now cites another section of the ITAR, Section
126.1, titled, “Prohibited exports, imports, and sales to or from cer-
tain countries.”90 This section provides for a near-absolute bar to
exports of defense articles and defense services to certain coun-
tries91 and a qualified bar on exports to others, meaning that there
is generally a policy of denial to these countries with certain enu-
merated exceptions.92 The addition of this section is significant be-
cause it involves countries that are likely to be involved in opera-
tions warranting the use of the Section 126.4 exemption. Recall
that the exemption authorizes exports at the request or written di-
rection of the government, whether for end-use by U.S. persons or
not.93 The United States military carries out foreign assistance in
Section 126.1(b) countries, such as Afghanistan and Iraq.94 Much
of this foreign assistance supports peace and security, which is com-
prised of initiatives such as counter-narcotics, counter-terrorism,
transnational crime, combating weapons of mass destruction, and
stabilization.95 Though these programs are funded and monitored
by the government,
[m]ost development and humanitarian assistance activities are
not directly implemented by United States government person-
nel but by private sector entities, such as individual personal
service contractors, consulting firms, universities, private
89. The ITAR’s purpose is balancing national security with the economic interests of the
U.S. defense industry. Exemptions attempt to add nuance to this balance, but they create
additional risk to national security. See, e.g., Long, supra note 48, at 60 (“There are signifi-
cant concerns that terrorists or rogue states could acquire these defense articles from other
countries—even those friendly to the United States—that import these goods but do not have
the same strict export controls as the United States. It is therefore unclear how the State
Department will use its exemption authority in the future.”).
90. 22 C.F.R. § 126.1 (2019).
91. See id. § 126.1(d)(1) (setting forth a policy of license denial to Belarus, Burma, China,
Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Syria, and Venezuela).
92. Id. § 126.1(d)(2).
93. 22 C.F.R. § 126.4(b) (2019 Amended Rule).
94. In 2018, the United States government spent $999,741,283.00 on assistance to Af-
ghanistan and $452,070,635.00 to Iraq. Map of Foreign Assistance Worldwide, U.S. DEP’T OF
STATE, https://www.foreignassistance.gov/explore (Nov. 6, 2020) (Select Iraq or Afghanistan,
and filter to “2018” and “Spent.”).
95. Of the 2018 foreign assistance funding to Afghanistan and Iraq, peace and security
projects made up $80,248,924.00 and $53,764,002.00 respectively. Id. (Select Iraq or Afghan-
istan; then filter to “2018,” and “Spent,” and “Peace and Security.”).
400 Duquesne Law Review Vol. 59
voluntary organizations (PVOs), or public international organ-
izations (PIOs).96
This arrangement leaves non-governmental parties responsible
for carrying out these billion-dollar programs and accountable to
ensure that they are done safely and efficiently. The addition of the
Section 126.1 provision in the new exemption language is a nod to
those contractors whom the prior exemption left wondering if oth-
erwise-prohibited countries was in the scope of Section 126.4. Here,
the DDTC affirmatively states that they are not and puts that ques-
tion to rest.97
III. INCREASED CONTRACTOR FLEXIBILITY, DECREASED
GOVERNMENTOVERSIGHT: COMPETING ARGUMENTS ON THE
SECTION 126 EXEMPTION
A. The Role of Contractors in Defense Administration Has In-
creased the Need for Less Restrictive Export Controls to Main-
tain Compliance
The expansion of the government exemption reflects the law’s ad-
aptation to the need for contractors to support military operations.
Though the military has always employed contractors to conduct
wartime operations, “[t]heir support is no longer an adjunct, ad hoc
add-on to supplement a capability.”98 In 2007, there were an esti-
mated 100,000 civilian contract workers in Iraq alone.99 Today, the
number of security contractors in Afghanistan is estimated at
5,800, raising concern about concealment of what is really happen-
ing “on the ground.”100 Critics against the use of private contractors
claim that contractors are employed to give the appearance of de-
96. MARIAN L. LAWSON & EMILY M. MORGENSTERN, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R40213,
FOREIGN AID: AN INTRODUCTION TOU.S. PROGRAMS AND POLICY 18 (2019).
97. 22 C.F.R. § 126.4(d) (2019 Amended Rule) (“This section does not authorize any de-
partment or agency of the U.S. Government to make or authorize any export that is otherwise
prohibited by any other administrative provisions or by any statute that is inconsistent with
U.S. arms embargoes or United Nations Security Council Resolutions (see § 126.1).”).
98. Campbell, supra note 19.
99. CARRIE HUNTER & DANIEL GOURE, LEXINGTON INST., CONTRACTORS ON THE
BATTLEFIELD 1 (2007).
100. Paul D. Shinkman, Afghanistan’s Hired Guns, US NEWS (Apr. 26, 2019, 5:00 AM),
https://www.usnews.com/news/national-news/articles/2019-04-26/us-employs-unprecedente
d-number-of-security-contractors-in-afghanistan (“‘The main problem with contractors of all
sorts is there’s just not enough attention to what they’re doing. That’s not been reported out
in a clear way to anybody’s satisfaction for all these years,’ says Catherine Lutz, a professor
at Brown University and a director of its Costs of War project, which documents the use of
private contractors in U.S. conflicts. ‘The Pentagon should be telling us, the American public,
who’s funding this, what that means, why this is happening.’”).
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escalation by withdrawing “troops,” as in military personnel, but
merely replacing them with “hired guns.”101
The United States Army (Army) characterizes battlefield contrac-
tors as either systems contractors, external support contractors, or
theater support contractors.102 These contractors’ roles range from
providing support for weapons and other materiel, supporting the
combat authority at headquarters, and simply providing goods and
services to service members.103 The Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Lo-
gistics Doctrine states that the “DOD relies on contractors to per-
form many tasks . . . such as base operating support[,] intra-theater
transportation, logistics services, maintenance, storage, construc-
tion, security operations, and common-user commodities.”104 The
law has adapted with the changing composition of the battlefield to
grant privileges to contractors that were previously reserved for the
military, and the expansion of the government exemption appears
to be one such example.
Another such development is the trend of hybrid Foreign Military
Sales (FMS) and Direct Commercial Sales, an arrangement where
“the main defense article [is] provided through direct commercial
sales and classified systems, weapons, and/or upgrades [are] pro-
vided through FMS.”105 This type of contract means that the gov-
ernment carries out one portion of the contract, while the private
contractor is responsible for the others; therefore, the export obli-
gations of the government and the contractor are inextricably
linked in order to perform the contract, which incentivizes the gov-
ernment to ensure that the contractor can meet its obligations in a
timely manner.
Further, the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulations Supple-
ment (DFARS) requires that defense contracts place the burden of
export compliance upon the contractor and their subcontractors.106
This lessens the liability on the contracting agency for mistaken
commodity classifications or incorrect interpretations of State
101. Id.
102. HUNTER&GOURE, supra note 99, at 2.
103. Id. at 3.
104. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, DEP’T OFDEF., JOINT LOGISTICS, at xi (2019).
105. Derek Gilman et al., Foreign Military Sales & Direct Commercial Sales, DEP’T OF
DEF. & DEF. SEC. COOP. AGENCY 14 (Sept. 30, 2014), https://www.dsca.mil/sites/default
/files/final-fms-dcs_30_sep.pdf.
106. 48 C.F.R. § 252.225-7048(b) (2019) (requiring federal defense contracts to include the
following clause: “The Contractor shall comply with all applicable laws and regulations re-
garding export-controlled items, including, but not limited to, the requirement for contractors
to register with the Department of State in accordance with the ITAR. The Contractor shall
consult with the Department of State regarding any questions relating to compliance with
the ITAR and shall consult with the Department of Commerce regarding any questions re-
lating to compliance with the EAR.”).
402 Duquesne Law Review Vol. 59
Department regulations, such as the appropriate use of the exemp-
tion at issue here. Because of this heightened regulatory and oper-
ational responsibility on private contractors to execute national se-
curity and foreign assistance activities, these entities must receive
specific guidance to improve their compliance programs and operate
more efficiently with their government partners. The 2019 amend-
ment to Section 126.4 is one such regulatory change.
The use of civilian contractors in battlefield operations raises nu-
merous legal questions related to international and military law,107
but the focus here is whether the expansion of the ITAR to allow
civilians to carry out defense exports at the request of the United
States government goes a step too far in authorizing contractors to
conduct inherently governmental functions. Below is an examina-
tion of potential scenarios where contractors who would previously
have been limited in their use of the government exemption may
find new opportunity with the amended rule.
1. Application of the Section 126.4 Exemption
One scenario where the revisions to Section 126.4 may benefit
exporters and the DoD alike is during the performance of an Indef-
inite-Delivery/Indefinite-Quantity (IDIQ) contract. IDIQ contracts
arise when “the Government cannot predetermine, above a speci-
fied minimum, the precise quantities of supplies or services that the
Government will require during the contract period . . . .”108 IDIQ’s
are a more convenient contract arrangement for the government,
where the contract is awarded to multiple contractors and the com-
petition lies at the task order level.109 Between 2011 and 2015, the
DoD accounted for sixty-eight percent of all of the federal govern-
ment’s IDIQ contracts.110 The Government Accountability Office
(GAO) investigated the DoD’s use of IDIQ contracts in 2017, report-
ing:
[i]n addition, [DoD] officials told us that the contracts they
used served a broader customer base, for example, multiple
commands, other federal agencies, and foreign military sales.
By not needing to specify an exact quantity or timing of
107. See supra text accompanying notes 19–21.
108. 48 C.F.R. § 16.504(b) (2019).
109. Gregory R. Hallmark, 2019 NDAA Analysis: Enhancing IDIQs and Other Provisions,
HOLLAND & KNIGHT GOV’T CONTS. BLOG (May 15, 2019), https://www.hklaw.com/en/in-
sights/publications/2019/05/2019-ndaa-analysis-enhancing-idiqs-and-other-provisions.
110. U.S. GOV’TACCOUNTABILITYOFF., GAO-17-329, AGENCIESWIDELYUSED INDEFINITE
CONTRACTS TO PROVIDE FLEXIBILITY TOMEETMISSIONNEEDS (2017).
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delivery at the time of contract award, program offices can ac-
commodate unforeseen needs on an ongoing basis through is-
suance of orders. For example, an Army contract for Aerial
Target Systems training and testing is intended for use by all
military departments as well as foreign military partners.
Since the need for testing and training varies depending on the
customer, these requirements were less defined at contract
award, and will be more clearly specified at the time of order.111
The IDIQ arrangement requires the contractor to be agile in its
ability to support operations, which presumably creates an in-
creased burden to ship supplies on very short notice.
The GAO’s report also discussed two contracts for Unmanned
Aircraft Systems (UAS), which provided “support for overseas con-
tingency operations.”112 UAS operations often require “[c]ontrac-
tors [to be] deployed for weapon systems maintenance operate out
of established overseas military installations or highly secured for-
ward operating bases.”113 If the exporter was obligated under the
contract to transport the equipment to contractors overseas, then
prior to the 2019 amendment, it would not have qualified for the
“for official use”114 element of Section 126.4(a) or the “for end-use
by” provision of Section 126.4(c),115 even though it was supporting
American military operations.
One illustrative DoD contract opportunity calls for Requests for
Information from industry for procurement of supplies and services
“related to integration of a [counter-UAS Family of Systems].”116
Under this contract, the “systems integration partner” will be re-
sponsible for integrating sensors and systems to provide “layered
defense for [Special Operations Forces] Operators in a variety of . . .
environments [outside of the continental United States
(OCONUS)].”117 The contractor will need to “[c]oordinate with the
111. Id. at 14.
112. Id. at 18–19.
113. Keric D. Clanahan, Wielding a “Very Long, People-Intensive Spear”: Inherently Gov-
ernmental Functions and the Role of Contractors in U.S. Department of Defense Unmanned
Aircraft Systems Missions, 70 A.F. L. REV. 119, 173 (2013).
114. 22 C.F.R. § 126.4(a) (2019 Pre-Amended Rule).
115. Id. § 126.4(c) (2019 Pre-Amended Rule).
116. Contract Opportunity: Counter Unmanned Systems (CUxS), Systems Integration
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Government logistics team in the fielding of packaged solutions.”118
The contract will also require contractors to be able to “staff and
support 24x7 work week . . . including . . . OCONUS deployments
to active armed conflict areas.”119 This solicitation exemplifies the
integrated nature of the contractor-military relationship in UAS op-
erations and illustrates the contractor’s need—and government’s
expectation—of flexibility to provide overseas support “in the event
of an immediate surge or a reduction in requirements.”120
In the absence of an advisory opinion from DDTC, a risk-averse
company would err on the side of first seeking authorization from
DDTC rather than relying on direction from the DoD. The 2019
amendment, however, provides clearer guidance for exporters in
this position and expressly answers the looming question of
whether the exemption applies to private entities.121 The exemp-
tion now provides for entities in a contractual relationship with the
government to export without a license in specific circumstances,122
or for any person or entity to ship to the government without a li-
cense as long as it is at its written direction.123
B. The Exemption May Continue to Exacerbate Agencies’ Over-
sight Challenges
1. A Note on Department of Commerce’s GOV Exemption
Though the focus of this article is the ITAR exemption for gov-
ernment use, the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry
and Security’s (BIS) role in regulating sensitive exports cannot be
understated. While the State Department has jurisdiction over the
export of defense articles on the munitions list, the Commerce De-
partment’s jurisdiction covers the export of quite literally every-
thing else. BIS regulates exports through the Export Administra-
tion Regulations (EAR) Commerce Control List (CCL), the scope of
which covers the export of everything from nuts and bolts to com-
mercial aircraft. As a result, contractors involved in defense ex-
ports often juggle both the ITAR and the EAR when shipments in-
clude both military equipment and commercial products. The CCL
also regulates “dual-use” items, also known as “600-series” items,




121. 22 C.F.R. § 126.4(a)(1)(ii)(A)–(D) (2019 Amended Rule).
122. Id. (2019 Amended Rule).
123. Id. § 126.4(b) (2019 Amended Rule).
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Export Control Reform Initiative, an administrative attempt at
harmonizing the multiple export control regimes.
The EAR contains a number of exceptions, as the ITAR does ex-
emptions, which allow exporters to ship without a license. Notably,
the EAR contains an exception called GOV.124 This regulation gen-
erally authorizes exporters to ship products (excluding 600-series
items) when they are “for personal use by personnel and agencies
of the U.S. Government,”125 when they are “made by or consigned to
a department or agency of the U.S. Government,”126 or when they
are “made for or on behalf of a department or agency of the U.S.
Government.”127
This third option somewhat mirrors the contentious language of
the §126.4 exemption, but it sheds some additional light. The reg-
ulation goes on to authorize exports that are “for use by a depart-
ment or agency of the U.S. Government, when: [t]he items are des-
tined to a U.S. person; and [t]he item is exported . . . pursuant to a
contract between the exporter and . . . the U.S. Government.”128 The
exception further applies to exports to “support . . . cooperative pro-
gram[s] . . . or arrangement[s] with a foreign government or inter-
national organization,”129 much like the ITAR exemption. Finally,
the exception explicitly authorizes exports without a license “pur-
suant to an official written request or directive from the U.S. De-
partment of Defense,”130 again raising the question of what consti-
tutes a written request or directive.
This exception may also be used to ship to cooperating govern-
ments or NATO members, again excluding 600-series items and a
number of other exclusions.131 The use of this exception does not
appear to require a contract, written direction, or even consent of
the U.S. Government.
EAR compliance is extremely important for exporters. Not only
is the jurisdiction incredibly broad, but the regulations are more
complex, and the enforcement actions for violations tend to be even
more severe than those imposed upon ITAR violators. Though the
goal to completely harmonize the export control regimes into one
set of regulations never came to fruition, defense contractors with
ITAR-controlled products must also understand their obligations
124. 15 C.F.R. § 740.11 (2020).
125. Id. § 740.11(b)(2)(i).
126. Id. § 740.11(b)(2)(ii).
127. Id. § 740.11(b)(2)(iii).
128. Id. § 740.11(b)(2)(iii)(A)(1) (2).
129. Id. § 740.11(b)(2)(iii)(B).
130. Id. § 740.11(b)(2)(iv).
131. Id. § 740.11(c).
406 Duquesne Law Review Vol. 59
under the Commerce Department’s EAR when it comes to carrying
out military contracts, as more and more formerly ITAR-controlled
products shift under the watchful eye of BIS.
2. Improved Alignment Between the State Department and
the DoD: Two Arms of American Foreign Policy
Though defense contractors generally see this rule as a tri-
umph,132 it illustrates a more widespread concern related to admin-
istrative oversight of national security and foreign policy. Section
III(A) discussed the increasing role of contractors in overseas mili-
tary operations, a necessity for the DoD to augment its personnel,
but a bane for government accountability.
If export controls pose a question of balance of powers, it does not
fall within the traditional debate of legislative versus executive
powers. Considering all the governmental actions that plague legal
analysts as to the federal balance of powers, the authority over
arms controls historically, and mostly uncontestably, bends toward
the executive branch. Dating back to United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Export Corp.,133 the president has had broad discretion over
decisions concerning national security. The Court held that “the
President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative
of the nation.”134 The more pressing struggle over authority to ad-
minister the AECA is between the administrative agencies with a
stake in foreign policy.135
The AECA delegates the authority and the duty to control arms
exports to the State Department.136 The role that arms exports play
in foreign policy, however, extends beyond the State Department
into the realm of national defense, necessarily implicating the DoD
and other national security agencies. Though these agencies fall
under the control of the executive, each agency has a distinct char-
ter with regard to the execution of foreign policy.
The DDTC’s mission is, “[e]nsuring commercial exports of defense
articles and defense services advance U.S. national security and for-
eign policy objectives.”137 Generally, the State Department’s role in
arms administration can be broken into three prongs: policy,
132. See, e.g., Shane & Scheetz, supra note 65.
133. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
134. Id. at 319.
135. See, e.g., IAN F. FERGUSSON & PAUL K. KERR, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R41916, THE U.S.
EXPORT CONTROL SYSTEM AND THE EXPORT CONTROL REFORM INITIATIVE 3–4 (2019).
136. 22 U.S.C. § 2752(b).
137. The Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC), U.S. DEP’T OF STATE
DIRECTORATE OF DEF. TRADE CONTROLS, https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/ddtc_public?id=ddt
c_public_portal_about_us_landing (last visited Jan. 10, 2020).
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licensing, and enforcement.138 In its capacity for determining de-
fense trade policy, the DDTC is primarily responsible for maintain-
ing the ITAR, developing technology policy, and analysis of end-us-
ers and countries to establish export eligibility.139 The licensing
arm coordinates review and approval of all export licenses and
agreements, as well as provides guidance and advisory opinions to
exporters.140 Finally, the enforcement arm of the DDTC “is tasked
with ensuring compliance with the AECA and ITAR through civil
enforcement of the regulations and coordination with law enforce-
ment regarding criminal violations.”141
Meanwhile, the DoD’s primary agency concerned with arms con-
trols is the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), whose
mission is to “advance U.S. national security and foreign policy in-
terests by building the capacity of foreign security forces to respond
to shared challenges. DSCA leads the broader U.S. security coop-
eration enterprise in its efforts to train, educate, advise, and equip
foreign partners.”142 DSCA administers cooperation programs and
FMS transactions with the goal of bolstering allies’ military and in-
stitutional capabilities in alignment with U.S. interests.143
Although the federal agencies are aligned to a unified policy as to
the proscribed end-users, locations, and purposes of arms exports,
the DoD is in a unique and potentially conflicted position as both a
regulator of defense trade as well as a party to the transaction. On
one hand, the interest of national security would warrant a full and
thorough investigation of each transaction, down to each shipment
and email concerning controlled defense articles. On the other
hand, the DoD’s realistic need for expeditious overseas support for
itself and its allies poses a dichotomous stake in export controls.
The application of many of these ITAR exemptions concerning of-
ficial use by the U.S. government requires the execution of an ex-
emption letter.144 In calendar years 2004 to 2006, the DoD and its
various components certified 1,900 letters for more than 270
138. Id.
139. Defense Trade Controls Policy (DTCP), U.S. DEP’T OF STATE
DIRECTORATE OF DEF. TRADE CONTROLS, https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/ddtc_public?id=ddt
c_kb_article_page&sys_id=47ee3b08dbc7bf0044f9ff621f9619d7 (last visited Jan. 10, 2020).
140. Defense Trade Controls Licensing (DTCL), supra note 43.
141. Defense Trade Controls Compliance (DTCC), U.S. DEP’T OF STATE
DIRECTORATE OF DEF. TRADE CONTROLS, https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/ddtc_public?id=ddt
c_kb_article_page&sys_id=000d7b84dbc7bf0044f9ff621f9619a3 (last visited Jan. 19, 2020).
142. Mission, Vision, and Values, DEF. SEC. COOP. AGENCY, https://www.dsca.mil/about-
us/mission-vison-values (last visited Jan. 19, 2020).
143. Id.
144. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITYOFF., supra note 62.
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exporters.145 The State Department has no prior review of any
transactions authorized certified under these exemption letters,
which has caused friction amongst the agencies.146 Generally, the
process is as follows:
[s]ome ITAR exemptions apply to exports that directly benefit
[DoD] activities, ranging from support of defense cooperative
programs, such as the Joint Strike Fighter, to providing equip-
ment and technical services necessary to support U.S. forces in
foreign locations. For such exemptions, [DoD] confirms
whether the export activity appropriately qualifies for the use
of an exemption and typically documents this confirmation in
a written letter directly to the exporter or sometimes to the cog-
nizant [DoD] program office that the exemption will benefit.147
Certification guidelines were drafted but never issued depart-
ment-wide.148 DoD Instruction 2040.02 provides that the Director
of the Defense Technology Security Administration is responsible
for developing policy of how the DoD uses ITAR exemptions, but
this directive does not explain exactly what that policy is.149 The
Foreign Military Sales Handbook provides some, but very limited
guidance on how the DoD should handle this exemption.150 Agen-
cies may authorize the use of the exemption “by submitting a writ-
ten request through the Technology Security Directorate of the De-
fense Threat Reduction Agency.”151 One 2004 memo from the Un-
der-Secretary of Defense offered some guidance on how the Section
124.6 exemption should be invoked by military departments, but
this guidance appears to have expired in 2006.152 Similarly, the
National Security Administration, which is under the oversight of
the Department of Homeland Security, appears to have its own, dis-





149. DEP’T OF DEF., INSTRUCTION NO. 2040.02, Enclosure 2, 3.a, 3.p (Mar. 27, 2014),
https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodi/204002p.pdf?ver=2019-0
1-28-141235-830.
150. ANTHONY J. PERFILIO, FOREIGN MILITARY SALES HANDBOOK § 10:65: EXPORTS FOR
U.S. GOVERNMENT ENDUSE, n.1, Westlaw (2019).
151. Id.
152. Memorandum from Lisa Bronson, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, Technology
Security Policy and Counterproliferation, to Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for De-
fense Exports and Cooperation; Director, Navy International Programs Office; Deputy Under
Secretary of the Air Force for International Programs, at 6 (Mar. 8, 2004) (on file with au-
thor).
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via its Technology Security and Export Control Office.153 As such,
there is no standard protocol for how government officials should
certify the use of ITAR exemptions, and limited confidence in the
reliability of the data for the State Department to validate.
One of the most significant concerns raised by the State Depart-
ment was that the DoD was improperly certifying the use of the
former Section 126.4(a) to authorize contractors, asserting that the
use of that exemption was reserved for United States government
personnel only.154 Guidelines issued to the military departments
set forth the circumstances under which they are authorized to cer-
tify the use of Section 126.4.155 Paragraph (d) provides that Sec-
tions 126.4(a) and (c) may be used:
when the services of US persons (e.g., US industry) are re-
quired pursuant to the following USG activities: 1. USG sales,
loans, leases or grants of defense articles, services and tech-
nical data to foreign governments . . . . 2. International cooper-
ative armaments research, development and acquisition agree-
ments. 3. Government-to-government military and civilian
personnel exchange agreements. 4. Combined military opera-
tions and training. 5. Unilateral US military operations
abroad.156
Thus, the memo concedes that U.S. industry is needed to support
these types of missions and represents the DoD’s policy of when pri-
vate entities may export their services, though this interpretation
was exactly what State had previously disagreed with.157 Para-
graphs (i) and (j) explain the standard for authorizing the export of
hardware using Section 126.4.158 The two paragraphs distinguish
between the former Sections 126.4(a) and (c), both of which author-
ize temporary imports and temporary or permanent exports of de-
fense articles, services, and technical data, but the significant dis-
tinctions between the two are that Section 126.4(a) was reserved for
transfers “for official use by the Military Department, or pursuant
to a USG sale, . . . or international cooperative armaments research,
development or acquisition agreement administered by theMilitary
Department”159 and Section 126.4(j) was for transfers “for end use
153. Technology Security and Export Control, NAT’L SEC. AGENCY CENT. SEC. SERV.,
https://www.nsa.gov/business/programs/export-control-policy/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2020).
154. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITYOFF., supra note 62.
155. Memorandum from Lisa Bronson, supra note 152, at 3 ¶ d(1)–(5).
156. Id.
157. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITYOFF., supra note 62.
158. Memorandum from Lisa Bronson, supra note 152, at 4 ¶ i, j.
159. Id. at 4 ¶ i.
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by the Military Department in a foreign country pursuant to a con-
tract with, or pursuant to the written direction of, that Depart-
ment.”160 The memo further specifies that the “[u]se of exemptions
will not be certified solely for the benefit of the exporter, . . . or for
exports to prohibited/embargoed/sanctioned/denied persons, desti-
nations[,] or entities.”161
The 2019 amendment appears to be a sign of progress in resolving
this dispute among the State Department and the DoD by carving
into the exemption specific circumstances under which a contrac-
tor’s export is “for official use by” or “on behalf of” the government.
However, in making such progress, this policy change can be inter-
preted as a concession by the State Department to allow contractors
to take on a role in foreign policy that was traditionally deemed to
be strictly governmental in nature.
3. DoD and Underreported Inherently Governmental Func-
tions
National security operations require a long, interconnected chain
of expert engineers, operators, and decision-makers to carry out
missions.162 DoD contractors perform a wide array of functions, in-
cluding “professional and management support, information tech-
nology support, and weapon system support.”163 Contractors are
therefore inextricably embedded with the military in ensuring mis-
sion success. Congress has acknowledged the military’s growing
reliance on private contractors and has since tightened the DoD’s
reporting requirements as to the number of contractors employed
and for what types of services.164 The GAO has found these reports
to be insufficient and the volume likely inaccurate.165
The concern raised is that DoD contractors are performing activ-
ities that cross the line into functions that an ordinary citizen would
expect to be reserved for government entities.166 The Federal Ac-
quisition Regulations (FAR) prohibit the use of federal contracts to
private firms for the provision of inherently governmental
160. Id. at 4 ¶ j.
161. Id. at 4 ¶ k.
162. See supra Section III(A).
163. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-17-17, DOD INVENTORY OF CONTRACTED
SERVICES: TIMELY DECISIONS AND FURTHER ACTIONS NEEDED TO ADDRESS LONG-STANDING
ISSUES 1 (2016).
164. 10 U.S.C. § 2330a(c) (approved 2019).
165. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITYOFF., supra note 163, at 10.
166. Clanahan, supra note 113, at 140 (citing Interview with James (Ty) Hughes, former
Deputy Gen. Counsel, Acquisitions, Office of the Sec’y of the Air Force (SAF/GCQ) (Feb. 13,
2012)).
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functions167 (IGF) and lays out a non-exhaustive list of examples,
including commanding military forces,168 conducting foreign rela-
tions,169 and directing or controlling intelligence and counter-intel-
ligence operations.170
The FAR go on to outline functions that are not inherently gov-
ernmental but “may approach being in that category because of the
nature of the function, the manner in which the contractor performs
the contract, or the manner in which the Government administers
contractor performance.”171 Such functions may include “[c]ontrac-
tors participating in any situation where it might be assumed that
they are agency employees or representatives.”172 These functions
are referred to as “closely associated with inherently governmental
functions” (CAIG).173
One particular function of the DoD that presents a severe risk of
IGF and CAIG is in the administration of UAS programs, also
known as drones.174 The DoD currently operates more than 11,000
UAS,175 up from 7,000 in just 2010.176 The human resources needed
for the engineering, manufacture, operation, maintenance, support,
and logistics related to maintaining a single UAS is astronomical
due to the rapid expansion of UAS systems for intelligence, surveil-
lance, and reconnaissance (ISR), and general mission support.177
UAS operations require contractor support because:
the medium to large UAS aircraft make up only a single com-
ponent of a very complex system. It involves U.S. based
grounded flight operators, sensor operators, communications
technicians, and imagery analysts, it includes fielded forces
and personnel directing takeoff, landing and recovery proce-
dures, and also includes forward deployed maintenance and
167. 48 C.F.R. § 7.503(a) (2020).
168. Id. § 7.503(c)(3).
169. Id. § 7.503(c)(4).
170. Id. § 7.503(c)(8).
171. Id. § 7.503(d).
172. Id. § 7.503(d)(13).
173. DEP’T OF DEF., HANDBOOK OF CONTRACT FUNCTION CHECKLISTS FOR
SERVICES ACQUISITION 7 (May 2018), https://www.dau.edu/cop/ace/DAU%20Sponsored%20
Documents/DoD_Handbook_for_Contract_Function_Checklists.pdf.
174. Clanahan, supra note 113, at 121.
175. Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS): DoD Purpose and Operational Use, U.S. DEP’T
OFDEF., https://dod.defense.gov/UAS/ (last visited Jan. 19, 2020).
176. Peter Singer, Unmanned Systems and Robotic Warfare, BROOKINGS INST. (Mar. 23,
2010), https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/unmanned-systems-and-robotic-warfare/.
177. Clanahan, supra note 113, at 138.
412 Duquesne Law Review Vol. 59
logistics crews who keep the aircraft and payload . . . mission
ready.178
The FAR’s superficial description of inherently governmental
functions fails to encapsulate the assembly line of activities that
contractors perform in the operation of UAS, but given the nature
of ISR missions, it could be argued that any control that a private
individual has over a UAS conducting an ISR mission could be vio-
lative of Section 7.503(d). The first step in this supply chain is the
transportation of the equipment, which now, due to Section
126.4(b), can be more leniently applied by the contractor. The GAO
warns that “the government can become overly reliant on contrac-
tors in some situations, such as when a contractor performs func-
tions that put an agency at risk of losing control over functions that
are core to its mission and operations.”179
The carving out of Section 126.4(b) to allow for contractors to ex-
ecute the export of defense articles without a license at the mere
request of the DoD is an extension of the trend toward increased
contractor control over certain military functions and, as a result,
diminished governmental oversight.
IV. CONCLUSION
If the goal of defense export controls is, as the AECA purports “a
world which is free from the scourge of war and the dangers and
burdens of armaments,”180 then regulatory exemptions reflect in-
stances where the need for exporters under contract with the mili-
tary to act quickly and stealthily outweighs the State Department’s
need for oversight. Often, the policy behind the ITAR exemption
hinges on the parties involved. The State Department’s concession
of Section 126.4 seems to rely upon its trust in its fellow federal
agencies to appropriately certify and monitor the actions of its con-
tractors exporting controlled military technology overseas. There
is some cause for concern in the State Department’s reliance on the
DoD. GAO’s findings that the DoD failed to properly report and
track the use of ITAR exemptions181 coupled with the DoD’s ques-
tionable oversight of contractors performing activities closely asso-
ciated with inherently governmental functions182 call into question
178. Id. at 137–38.
179. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITYOFFICE, supra note 163, at 1.
180. 22 U.S.C. § 2751.
181. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITYOFF., supra note 62.
182. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITYOFF., supra note 163 (“What GAO Found”).
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the national security risks associated with giving defense contrac-
tors greater deference in ensuring the legitimacy of their export.
It is not uncommon for weapons bought by the United States mil-
itary to find themselves in the hands of those whom they were pur-
chased to defend against.183 An independent organization “commit-
ted to working towards understanding the landscape of illicit
weapon flows”184 found that an anti-tankmissile was diverted to the
Islamic State within fifty-nine days, suggesting that “that there are
not many intermediaries in this chain of custody.”185
As the global War on Terror continues and tensions escalate with
Iran, the military’s reliance on contractors to operate and maintain
advanced weapons systems is only likely to grow. With the exist-
ence of contractor logistics support contracts, the DoD relies upon
timely shipment of hardware and spares to support active weapons
systems. State Department export controls apparently did not con-
template these time-sensitive and high-stakes contractual arrange-
ments. The amendment of Section 126.4 of the ITAR is evidence of
a trend toward reforming export laws to contemplate scenarios
where contractors are operating less like international arms bro-
kers and more like an extension of the DoD. The DoDmust improve
its oversight of private contractors in light of the State Depart-
ment’s increased leniency in order to minimize national security
risks.
183. E.g., Gabe Joselow, ISIS Weapons Arsenal Included Some Purchased by U.S.
Government, NBC NEWS (Dec. 14, 2017, 10:51 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/
isis-weapons-arsenal-included-some-purchased-u-s-government-n829201.
184. About Us, CONFLICT ARMAMENT RSCH., https://www.conflictarm.com/about-us/ (last
visited Jan. 20, 2020).
185. Joselow, supra note 183 (citing an interview with Damien Spleeters).
